

IN THE MATTER OF * BEFORE THE HOWARD COUNTY
CHARLES SIPERKO, et al. * BOARD OF APPEALS
6717 Mink Hollow Road * BA CASE NO. 24-022C
Highland, MD 20777 *

* * * * *

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Petitioners, Charles Siperko et al., by and through their undersigned counsel, respond to Protestants’ Motion for Reconsideration in the above-captioned matter as follows:

ARGUMENT

On June 5, 2025, the Howard County Board of Appeals (the “Board”) convened at 9 a.m. to hear the above-referenced petition (“Petition”) for approval of a conditional use for an outdoor athletic facility pursuant to Section 131.N.6. of the Howard County Zoning Regulations (“HCZR” or “the Regulations”). The Petition was appealed from the Hearing Examiner’s decision to dismiss the Petition to the Board pursuant to Section 16.304 of the Howard County Code, which provides in pertinent part that the Board hears the appeal de novo in accordance with Section 2.209 of the Board of Appeals Rules of Procedure. An application for a conditional use is a matter of original jurisdiction for the Board. HCZR Sec. 130.0.B.5. *See also* Howard County Charter, Art. V, Sec. 501(b)(Howard County’s Charter created and entrusts the functions and powers relating to hearing and deciding such matters as set forth in Article 25A, Section 5(u) (Express Powers Act) now transferred and codified in Md. Code Ann. Local Government Sec. 10-305(b)(2), among which is the power to originally hear and decide conditional use applications). The fact that Howard County law provides that all matters that are to be heard by the Board are first heard and determined by the Hearing Examiner does not alter the Board’s

original jurisdiction over conditional use applications. The purpose of the Hearing Examiner is to hear and makes decisions on *inter alia* conditional use applications. An aggrieved party then has the right to file an appeal to the Hearing Examiner's decision after which the Board then hears the conditional use application *de novo* as if the Hearing Examiner's hearing never occurred. *See e.g.*, Letter to Steve Hunt, Chair, Howard County Board of Appeals, dated September 7, 2023 re. BA Case No. 796D and attachments which are included herewith as EXHIBIT A (A reverse and remand by the Hearing Examiner carries no weight once appealed). Thus, this case is before the Board as a matter of original jurisdiction, not appellate review as suggested by Protestants. The Protestants' incorrect assertion is a long-settled matter of Howard County law that has been repeatedly corrected, including the above-referenced Board of Appeals matter which included counsel for Protestants. For Protestants' counsel to again assert the opposite of what is contained in EXHIBIT A is misstatement of the law.

More to the point, because this case is a matter of original jurisdiction before the Howard County Board of Appeals, the "agency" that is accorded deference is the Board, not the Department of Planning and Zoning as claimed by Protestants. Other than its Technical Staff Report ("TSR"), the Department of Planning and Zoning ("DPZ") has no role in the instant case. The Board is the agency with original jurisdiction. Even if DPZ were to have made a determination in this case, which is dubious given the lack of any analysis provided by DPZ in its TSR, DPZ's decision is accorded no deference because it the Board of Appeals that is the agency with original jurisdiction. If or when this case is appealed to the Circuit Court for Howard County or the Appellate Courts of Maryland, it is the decision of the Board that will be reviewed and accorded deference, not the decision or lack thereof by DPZ.

Protestants have cited case law for the proposition that the Board's interpretation and determination of "athletic fields" under Section 131.N.6. of the HCZR is a purely legal issue and can neither be augmented by testimony nor reliance on common usage of the term. Protestants are wholly incorrect.

In *Crawford v. Cnty. Council of Prince George's Cnty.*, 482 Md. 680 (2023), the issue before the Supreme Court of Maryland was whether the agency with original jurisdiction (the Prince George's County Planning Board) had properly interpreted the terms "warehouse unit" and "distribution facility." The Supreme Court declared the issue to be mixed questions of law and fact. The Court reviewed the evidence presented before the Planning Board, including the testimony of witnesses, and gave deference to the Planning Board's determination. Declining an argument similar to the Protestants in this case that the interpretation of the applicable terms was a purely legal issue that the Court should hear *de novo*, the Supreme Court emphasized the deferential nature of the applicable substantial evidence standard of review. The *Crawford* decision is informative to this case before the Board, but not at all for the reasons as set forth by Protestants. Instead, it is the exact opposite. The Board's determination that a go-kart track can be considered an athletic field under the HCZR is fairly debatable considering the evidence that was presented to the Board. There was more than substantial evidence (i.e. more than a scintilla of evidence) in this case to support the Board's interpretation and determination.

While it is accurate that the Supreme Court reviewed Merriam-Webster's dictionary to aid its decision affirming the Planning Board's decision in *Crawford*, no evidence has been presented in this case that any dictionary definition contradicts Exhibit 4 and the Petitioner's proffered definition of Athletic Fields. Protestants claim that they had multiple competing dictionary terms the Board should have considered via counsel's argument. First, the video of

the hearing clearly reveals that the Protestants declined to present any evidence including any dictionary definitions. There are also no instances where the Board refused to consider any proffered definition. Notwithstanding, Petitioner has no objection to Protestants who seek to extend the last public hearing to now introduce via their Motion for Reconsideration what they claim are other definitions that are somehow inconsistent with Petitioner's Exhibit 4. As a reminder, Petitioner's Exhibit 4 provides that an "athletic field" means "a piece of land prepared and used for playing a game or sporting activity. . ." ¹ Protestants' definitions from Vocabuarly.com and Thefreedictionary.com for "athletic field" are "a piece of land prepared for playing a game." It is unclear in what manner Protestants are asserting that Thefreedictionary.com's definition materially differs from the definition provided in Petitioner's Exhibit 4. In fact, Petitioner would argue that there is no material difference.

Protestants, experiencing the same problem that plagued the Petitioner in finding dictionary sources which define the multiple words "athletic field(s)", attempt to divide the terms contained in the HCZR into "athletic" and "field" and focus merely on the term "field" arguing that Dictionary.com's definition ("a piece of ground devoted to sports or contests; playing field" and Collins English Dictionary definition ("an area of grass, for example in a park or a farm") somehow disqualify the proposed go-kart track as an athletic field.

¹ Protestants go to great lengths to impugn Exhibit 4 claiming that its source is somehow illegitimate. Contrary to the implication that Petitioner somehow cherry-picked one, isolated definition to support its argument, Petitioner follows the lead of Protestants and has no objection to the Board considering any other definitions that are provided in a simple search of the internet. Included herewith as EXHIBIT B are several other examples where the entire "athletic field" term is defined, including a general artificial intelligence search, which scans and reviews all on-line sources to provide a definition of "athletic field." There is simply no source that contradicts the Board's interpretation and determination.

Petitioner presented ample evidence that “athletic fields” can be and are, in fact, impervious surfaces. The notion that the term “athletic fields” must be broken up into its subcomponents and is required to only be grass is both contradicted by the evidence in this case and the Board’s “common experience and common sense” with other athletic fields in Howard County. The use of common experience and common sense by the Board was expressly approved of by the Supreme Court in the *Crawford* decision. *Id.* at 703. Separating the term “athletic fields” to highlight just “fields” is a forced interpretation that is belied by both the evidence in this case and the Board’s common experience and common sense.

Likewise, the *Kor-Ko Ltd. V. Maryland Department of the Environment*, 451 Md. 401 (2017) decision does not support the Protestants’ argument that the Board should have found in their favor. In *Kar-Ko*, the Supreme Court examined *inter alia* MDE’s interpretation and determination of the word “premises.” Again, the Supreme Court gave deference to MDE’s interpretation of its own regulations, “especially mindful of that agency’s expertise in its field.” Contrary to the point asserted by Protestants, the Court viewed the entirety of MDE’s decision including all of the evidence considered by MDE and not only accorded deference to MDE’s interpretation, but also to MDE’s purported purpose of ensuring that its interpretation advanced the purpose of its regulations. The *Kar-Ko* decision supports the exact opposite of the point argued by Protestants. Namely, that the Supreme Court would accord deference to this Board for not only its interpretation based on what it regarded as reasonable sources, but also that its determination was consistent with the statutory framework of conditional uses allowed as outdoor athletic facilities. In short, Protestants have provided case law that supports the decisions made by this Board on June 5, 2025, and constitutes additional, binding authority that the Board’s decision was entirely proper.

As for the other ancillary arguments made by Protestants, nothing has been presented that would require reconsideration of the Board's determination. First, there is no requirement that evidence sought to be introduced at a hearing must be provided to opponents in advance of the hearing date. There is simply no such requirement in the Board's Rules of Procedure. Protestants even admit in their Motion for Reconsideration on page 3 that "[w]hile permitting [Petitioner] to submit exhibits subsequent to the start of the hearing was not in itself and issue, doing so without giving Protestants proper opportunity to rebut that evidence during the hearing amounted to prejudice." As pointed out above, this was not the case during the hearing. In fact, Board member and Vice-Chair Foehrkolb pointed out during deliberations that she had reviewed a dictionary definition and was of the opinion that such definition was not at odds with Petitioner's Exhibit 4. But, again, Petitioner has no objection to the Board's consideration of additional definitions for "athletic field." Accordingly, to the extent that Protestants assert the Board erred, if there was such error, which Petitioner asserts that there was not, Protestants have now had ample opportunity to present its definitions for the Board's consideration. Consequently, the Protestants' allegation of error is harmless error at best.

Lastly, how Howard County's neighboring jurisdictions treat go-kart race tracks is entirely irrelevant to the Board's interpretation of the HCZR. There is no provision in the HCZR that requires or even suggests that the Board refer to the laws of neighboring jurisdictions to define "athletic fields." Even if Protestants could somehow assert such a requirement, the lack of any context for the laws of the neighboring jurisdictions, including the facts of whether such uses are conditional uses or uses in rural areas such as the RR-DEO district or a myriad of other considerations precludes applicability as binding or persuasive sources.

For all the reasons set forth above and given under Sec. 2.212 of the Board's Rules of Procedure, the Protestants have the burden to establish a mistake of fact or mistake of law and have failed to do so, therefore the Board should deny Protestants' Motion for Reconsideration.

Respectfully submitted,

TALKIN & OH, LLP

/s/ Sang W. Oh

Sang W. Oh
5100 Dorsey Hall Drive
Ellicott City, MD 21042
soh@talkin-oh.com
(410) 964-0300
Counsel for Petitioners

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on June 16, 2025, a copy of the foregoing was sent via first-class mail, postage pre-paid and via electronic mail, to:

Howard County Board of Appeals
3430 Court House Drive
Ellicott City, MD 21043

G. Macy Nelson
Law Office of G. Macy Nelson, LLC
600 Washington Avenue, Suite 202
Towson, MD 21204
gmacynelson@gmacynelson.com
Counsel for Protestants

/s/ Sang W. Oh

Sang W. Oh

LAW OFFICES OF
TALKIN & OH, LLP
COLUMBIA OFFICE
5100 DORSEY HALL DRIVE
ELLCOTT CITY, MARYLAND 21042-7870

(410) 964-0300
(301) 596-6500
Fax: (410) 964-2008

September 7, 2023

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL (kberg@howardcountymd.gov) (Original Will Not Follow)

Steve Hunt, Chairman
Howard County Board of Appeals
c/o Kel Berg, Administrator
3430 Courthouse Drive
Ellicott City, MD 21043

RE: Michelle and Bradley Kline, *et al.*
BA Case No. 796D

Dear Mr. Hunt:

This correspondence is being provided to you in accordance with Board of Appeals Rules of Procedure Section 2.204(i)(correspondence with the Board) and, if determined to be applicable, Section 2.207(e)(motions).

This office represents Edmund Pollard and Joyce Adcock, the property owners and interested parties in the above-referenced matter, which arises from the approval of an alternative compliance application for specimen tree removal by the 3 member panel comprised of Howard County's Department of Planning and Zoning, Department of Recreation and Parks and Office of Community Sustainability (the "Panel"). The Panel's decision was heard in a *de novo* appeal by Hearing Examiner, Joyce Nichols, Esq., who rendered a decision and order on August 4, 2023, reversing the Panel's approval and remanding the case to the Department of Planning and Zoning for action in accordance with her decision.

This office filed an appeal of the Hearing Examiner's decision on or about August 16, 2023, pursuant to the provisions of Howard County Code Sec. 16.304:

A person aggrieved by a decision of a Hearing Examiner may, within 30 days of the issuance of the decision, appeal the decision to the Board of Appeals. Unless the appeal is of a citation issued under subtitle 16 of this title, the Board will hear the appeal *de novo* in accordance with section 2.209 or subsection 2.210(a) of the Code, as amended, as applicable.

Exhibit A

and Section 12.1 of the Howard County Board of Appeals Hearing Examiner Rules:

12.1. Appeals to Board. A person aggrieved by a decision of the hearing examiner may appeal it to the Board within 30 days of the issuance of the decision. An appeal must be submitted to the clerk on a form provided by the clerk.

On August 17, 2023, this office was informed by Kel Berg, Board of Appeals Administrator, that Hearing Examiner Nichols had instructed to not allow the scheduling of BA 796D for a hearing before the Board of Appeals because such appeal "is an interlocutory appeal." A copy of the Board of Appeals Administrator's e-mail is provided herewith. It is our understanding that the Board of Appeals Hearing Examiner is of the opinion that she maintains jurisdiction in this case despite our office's proper filing of a timely appeal. It is the Hearing Examiner's position that Mr. Pollard and Ms. Adcock cannot appeal her decision and order; rather, they must await action by the Panel in accordance with the decision and order. Only after the Panel renders its new decision can either party appeal the new decision with such appeal again proceeding to the Hearing Examiner. If there is an alternative explanation for the Hearing Examiner's position, our office has not been provided with such information.

The declination to set a properly filed appeal for a hearing before the Board of Appeals is both unprecedented and in contravention of Howard County law. In addition to the clear deprivation of the express right of appeal as provided in the plain language of the code provisions cited above, the history and legislative intent of the Howard County Hearing Examiner position is counter to the position taken by the Board of Appeals administrator. The Hearing Examiner position was created for the purpose of alleviating the workload of the Board of Appeals. The Hearing Examiner process was never intended to create an administrative appellate process that would replace the Board of Appeals' review of administrative decisions. As a reference, I provide a September 20, 2001 Memorandum from C. Vernon Gray, the County Councilman who proposed the legislation creating the Hearing Examiner position. As Dr. Gray noted in his explanation/justification for the then-new Hearing Examiner position, "[i]f any party is dissatisfied with the hearing examiner's decision, it may appeal directly to the Board of Appeals, which will hear the case *de novo* – that is, the Board will hear testimony, take evidence, and decide the case as if the hearing examiner's hearing had not occurred." The Board of Appeals' administrator's refusal to set a hearing date for the properly filed appeal of the Hearing Examiner's decision is a retreat from the representation made by Dr. Gray in his justification for the Hearing Examiner legislation, which has, heretofore, never been permitted.

Support for this original and what we assert must be the continuing and enduring purpose of the Hearing Examiner position has also been provided by the Howard County Office of Law in prior administrative and court proceedings. Dr. Gray's September 20, 2001 Memorandum was submitted by the Howard County Office of Law to the Howard County Circuit Court in Howard County Circuit Court Case No. 13-C-07-68144.

Steve Hunt
September 7, 2023
Page 3 of 4


While any party to an appeal is free to raise whatever arguments it determines appropriate, such arguments should be raised at a hearing before the Board of Appeals by the parties to the case. A unilateral decision by the Hearing Examiner, who without jurisdiction and without the benefit of a hearing to consider the arguments of the parties to the matter, determines that an appeal of her decision to the Board of Appeals should not be scheduled is violative of due process, an affront to the statutory framework and usurps the Board of Appeals' of its responsibility to manage its own docket. We fail to understand how this can be the proper role of the Howard County Board of Appeals Hearing Examiner.

Lastly, we are concerned about the delay being effected by the collective decision of the Board of Appeals Administrator and Hearing Examiner to not allowing the scheduling of the appeal. The instant appeal is the second time that Mr. Pollard and Ms. Adcock's proposed development will be before the Board. Additional appeals will most certainly follow. This case is a contentious matter that has and most likely be resolved at the highest levels of appellate review including the Board of Appeals and courts of law. Artificially creating more duplicative processes that exacerbate delays inherent in Howard County's administrative appeal process is unnecessarily punitive to Mr. Pollard and Ms. Adcock.

We request that the Chair take timely action to schedule this appeal for a hearing before the Board. Thank you for your time and consideration.

Very truly yours,

TALKIN & OH, LLP



By: Sang W. Oh

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that, on this 7th day of September 2023, a copy of the foregoing correspondence was forwarded in the manner denoted below, to:


Attorney for Michelle and Bradley Kline, *et al.*
G. Macy Nelson (*via email: gmacynelson@gmacynelson.com*)
600 Washington Avenue, Suite 202
Towson, MD 21202

Barry Sanders, Esq. (*via email: bsanders@howardcountymd.gov*)
David Moore, Esq. (*via email: dmoore@howardcountymd.gov*)

Steve Hunt
September 7, 2023
Page 4 of 4

Gary Kuc, Esq. (via email: gkuc@howardcountymd.gov)
George Howard Building
3430 Courthouse Drive
Ellicott City, MD 21043

Pursuant to Rule 2.207(e) of the Rules of Procedure of the Board of Appeals, any person interested in responding to this correspondence shall file a written response with the Board within fifteen days of the date that this correspondence was filed.


Sang W. Oh

Sang Oh

From: Berg, Kel <kberg@howardcountymd.gov>
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2023 3:57 PM
To: Sang Oh
Subject: RE: BA-796D (Edmund Pollard & Joyce Adcock)

Hi Sang, no worries about the confusion....we have a lot of cases to keep straight!

To answer your question, this case is not appealable because the Order is to remand to DPZ, which does not finally dispose of the case. If you look at the end of the D&O there is no notice regarding instruction on appealing the decision. The remand requires that action be taken or problems be fixed and once those corrections are made, that new decision may be appealed to the HE for a final appealable decision.

Kel L. Berg
Board Administrator
Howard County Boards Office
410 313 3114

From: Sang Oh <soh@talkin-oh.com>
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2023 2:49 PM
To: Berg, Kel <kberg@howardcountymd.gov>
Subject: FW: BA-796D (Edmund Pollard & Joyce Adcock)

[Note: This email originated from outside of the organization. Please only click on links or attachments if you know the sender.]

I'm sorry, Kel. We were talking about 2 different cases. I was talking about BA 795. Nevermind that.

I'm confused about this 796 appeal of the Hearing Examiner's decision. Why is this an interlocutory appeal? Would a call be easier? Thank you.

Sang W. Oh
Talkin & Oh, LLP
5100 Dorsey Hall Drive
Ellicott City, MD 21042
410-964-0300
410-964-2018 (f)

pronouns: he, him, his

From: Gina Pagani <gpagani@talkin-oh.com>
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2023 1:24 PM
To: Sang Oh <soh@talkin-oh.com>
Subject: FW: BA-796D (Edmund Pollard & Joyce Adcock)

Sang,

Toni just forwarded the below email.

Gina Pagani
Paralegal
Talkin & Oh, LLP
5100 Dorsey Hall Drive
Ellicott City, MD 21042-7870
410-964-0300
410-964-2008 fax
gpagani@talkin-oh.com

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From: Sieglein, Toni <tsieglein@howardcountymd.gov>
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2023 1:22 PM
To: Gina Pagani <gpagani@talkin-oh.com>
Subject: FW: BA-796D (Edmund Pollard & Joyce Adcock)

From: Berg, Kel <kberg@howardcountymd.gov>
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2023 1:11 PM
To: Sieglein, Toni <tsieglein@howardcountymd.gov>
Cc: Conrad, Peter <pconrad@howardcountymd.gov>; Miller, Kiasten <kmiller@howardcountymd.gov>
Subject: RE: BA-796D (Edmund Pollard & Joyce Adcock)

Hi Toni. This was an interlocutory order and therefore cannot be appealed.

Kel L. Berg
Board Administrator
Howard County Boards Office
410 313 3114

From: Sieglein, Toni <tsieglein@howardcountymd.gov>
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2023 12:53 PM
To: Berg, Kel <kberg@howardcountymd.gov>; Miller, Kiasten <kmiller@howardcountymd.gov>
Cc: Conrad, Peter <pconrad@howardcountymd.gov>
Subject: BA-796D (Edmund Pollard & Joyce Adcock)

Hi Kel & Kia,

This case got appealed to the Board of Appeals. Please schedule a hearing date.

Thank you,

Toni Sieglein
Public Service and Zoning
3430 Court House Drive, Ellicott City, MD 21043 | [Website](http://www.howardcountymd.gov)
[410-313-2424](tel:410-313-2424)



Howard County Council

George Howard Building
3430 Court House Drive
Ellicott City, Maryland 21043-4392

COUNCILMEMBERS

Guy Guzzone, Chairman
District 3
C. Vernon Gray, Vice Chairman
District 2
Allan H. Kittleman
District 5
Mary C. Latsung
District 4
Christopher J. Merdon
District 1

MEMORANDUM

To: Planning Board Members
From: C. Vernon Gray, Vice Chairman
County Council
Date: September 20, 2001
Re: Hearing Examiner Legislation

Please find attached for your review proposed legislation that I have pre-filed to establish a hearing examiner for the Howard County Board of Appeals. This bill is pursuant to an earlier bill establishing the position of hearing examiner. The goal in introducing this legislation is to alleviate the backlog of cases heard by the Board of Appeals and to expedite and improve the process by which citizens may have land use and other administrative issues heard and decided.

You will note that, under my bill, the hearing examiner will hear and decide all land use cases, including conditional uses. If any party is dissatisfied with the hearing examiner's decision, it may appeal directly to the Board of Appeals, which will hear the case *de novo* - that is, the Board will hear testimony, take evidence, and decide the case as if the hearing examiner's hearing had not occurred.

The advantage of this structure, which is based on the experience of other jurisdictions, is that most land use cases will be scheduled, heard, and decided far more expediently than under the current system. Non-controversial cases can be resolved quickly, and will not have to wait in line with other cases to be heard. Other jurisdictions indicate that only about 10-20% of the hearing examiner's cases are appealed to the Board. Thus, the more complex and controversial cases will still have full benefit of a hearing before the Board of Appeals, whose caseload will be greatly reduced.

You will also note that my bill eliminates the Planning Board's role of reviewing and making recommendations to the Board on land use cases. While the Board's review has no doubt been a valuable step in the process, I think you will agree that replacing it with the hearing examiner process provides the parties with the same, if not a greater, opportunity to air and refine the issues. It will also free the Planning Board to concentrate on its other important functions.



Memorandum
September 20, 2001
p. 2

I have also attached for your information a summary of this legislation. I welcome your thoughts and comments.

cc: Council Members
Board of Appeals
Barbara Cook
Joseph Rutter

**SUMMARY OF
PROPOSED HEARING EXAMINER LEGISLATION**

Jurisdiction of the Hearing Examiner [§16.302]

- ⇒ Provides that all cases currently heard by the Board of Appeals will first be heard by a hearing examiner, except:
 - ▶ Administrative appeals heard on the record, e.g., appeals from the Animal Matters Board, the Human Rights Commission, or Planning Board final decisions.
 - ▶ Cases in which the hearing examiner is disqualified. If the Board must hear a land use case because the hearing examiner is disqualified, the Planning Board will first review the case and give its recommendation.

Procedures [§16.303]

- ⇒ Provides that cases heard by the hearing examiner must be advertised and posted as currently provided in the Board's Rules of Procedure.
- ⇒ Allows the hearing examiner to determine the time and place of hearings.
- ⇒ Provides that the Office of Law will provide legal advice as needed.
- ⇒ Authorizes the hearing examiner to issue subpoenas and administer oaths.
- ⇒ Provides that the same burden of proof shall be applied to cases heard by the hearing examiner as is currently established for cases heard by the Board of Appeals.
- ⇒ Requires that other rules of procedure established by the hearing examiner must be approved by resolution of the County Council.

Appeals [§16.304]

- ⇒ Provides that an appeal of a hearing examiner's decision will be heard *de novo* by the Board of Appeals - that is, the Board will hear it as if it were newly filed with the Board and never heard by the hearing examiner. The Board will not review the decision of the hearing examiner, but will take evidence and make its own decision in accordance with its current Rules of Procedure.
- ⇒ Provides that the person taking the appeal will pay the costs of providing notice and advertising the appeal hearing.

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- ⇒ Provides that the person taking the appeal will pay the costs of providing notice and advertising the appeal hearing.



athletic fields

noun

Tacked by no one yet

Definition in: **English**

1. Open areas specifically designed for sports and physical activities, often featuring grass or turf surfaces, where individuals or teams engage in competitive or recreational games and events.

The local high school has several athletic fields where students practice soccer, track, and field events after school.

Start tacking to remember the definition of "athletic fields" the next time you hear it or read it.

NAB START TACKING

Discussion

2 comments

Yak Tack

47 days ago

Digging deep on **athletic fields**:

The term 'athletic fields' refers to outdoor areas specifically designed for sports and physical activities. The etymology of the phrase 'athletic fields' derives from the word 'athletic,' which comes from the Greek word 'athletikos,' meaning 'pertaining to athletic contests,' which is derived from 'athletes,' meaning 'contestant' or 'competitor.' The word 'fields' in this context refers to open areas of land designated for activities or games. Together, 'athletic fields' signifies spaces intended for physical competition and sports.

Yak Tack

47 days ago

Words related to **athletic fields**: sports fields, playing fields, athletic grounds, recreation fields,

Exhibit B

and sports complexes

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8 1/2 x 11

Search for a word



athletic field



 /æθl'ɛɪɪk f'i:ld/


 /aθl'ɛɪɪk f'i:ld/

Noun (1)

Definition & Meaning of "athletic field"

Athletic field

 NOUN



01 a place that is made for playing specific games and sports



Example



The team practiced on the **athletic field** after school.

The **athletic field** was crowded with players and spectators.



@langeek.co

Nearby Words

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athletic shoe

athletic sock

athletic supporter

athletic tape

athletic wear

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athletic field definition



An athletic field is an area of land that is prepared and used for playing games or engaging in sporting activities. These fields are designed to host sporting practices and events and often feature grass or turf surfaces.

Key aspects include their use for sports practice and events, and they may have supporting features like bleachers and lights. Surfaces are commonly grass or artificial turf, but can vary depending on the sport. Examples of sports played on athletic fields include soccer, baseball, and tennis. An athletic field is fundamentally a space for physical competition and sports.

AI responses may include mistakes. [Learn more](#)



3 sites

Athletic Field Definition | Law Ins
Athletic Field definition. Athletic Fi
of land prepared and used for play

Law Insider

athletic fields - Yak Tack
athletic fields. ... Tacked by no one
specifically designed for sports ar

Yak Tack

Pitch (sports field) - Wikipedia
The field of play generally include:
out-of-bounds areas that a playe

Wikipedia

Ask anything

